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In 1979, a youth driving a motorcycle accidentally ran into Wash-
ington lawyer Mike Giannotto (HLS 1978) while he was taking a walk
in a federal park.' Alarmed members of Congress held hearings that
documented a rising tide of accidents caused by motorcycles and mo-
torscooters in parks. House and Senate committees issued reports con-
cluding, in identical language: "Vehicles have no place in a park. They
spew exhaust; make noise; and create safety hazards for children, sen-
ior citizens, and others who frequent parks." The reports noted a 196o
federal statute providing that "bicycles cannot be brought into a feder-
ally owned park in the District of Columbia unless they are operated
safely." The committees' reports concluded that this law was insuffi-
cient because its focus was too narrow and its rule too vague. "What
is needed," the committees wrote, "is a prophylactic rule banning the
activities posing the greatest risk: operating vehicles, namely, motorcy-
cles, cars, and even motorscooters."
Based upon these findings, Congress in 198o enacted the following
statute:
Sec. i. No vehicles of any kind shall be allowed in any federally
owned park in the District of Columbia.
Sec. 2. Any person who brings or drives a vehicle into one of these
parks shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, which may be punished by a
fine not exceeding $500 or by a two-day incarceration, or both.
Sec. 3. "Vehicle" for purposes of this law means any mechanism
for conveying a person from one place to another.
The statute rid parks of motorcycles, but citizens later complained that
parks were becoming cluttered with skateboarders and the like. Re-
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. I appreciate comments from
James Brudney, Richard Posner, and Adrian Vermeule, as well as the excellent research assistance
of Daniel Freeman and Darsana Srinivasan, both Yale Law School Class of 2007. Professor Ver-
meule's assistance was gracious as well as valuable, because I was so dilatory in offering com-
ments on earlier drafts of his book.
I This incident, and the subsequent statutory history, are hypothetical. Some names have
been changed to protect the guilty.
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sponding to these criticisms, Parks Commissioner Karl Rover an-
nounced a "no tolerance" policy in enforcing the statute. A week later,
Rover arrested a seven-year-old girl for riding her tricycle in a federal
park. Would a judge interpret the Vehicles in the Park statute to cover
tricycular activity?
There has long been an accepted method for interpreting federal
statutes such as this one. Federal judges will decide the meaning of
statutory language in light of:
(i) its textual plain meaning, as gleaned from ordinary usage, dic-
tionaries, grammar, and linguistic canons (plain meaning sources);
(2) statutory structure and the content of other relevant statutes
(holistic sources);
(3) the statute's legislative history, especially as it pertains to statu-
tory purpose(s) and the compromises made (legislative history sources);
(4) authoritative judicial and agency interpretations (precedential
sources);
(5) the evolution of the statutory scheme, including new practices
and norms (evolutive sources); and
(6) substantive canons of statutory interpretation, including the rule
of lenity and the canon for avoiding absurd or constitutionally trouble-
some applications (normative sources).
2
Such a methodology is complicated in the "hard cases," but for ordi-
nary problems it works pretty simply because the factors will usually
be mutually reinforcing.
In the Case of the Tricycle, Commissioner Rover focused on (i) the
broad definition of "vehicle"; a tricycle does convey a person from one
place to another. It is also relevant, however, that (2) the i96o statute
allows bicycles into the park, so long as they are operated "safely." By
leaving in place this exception for bicycles, the i98o law assumes that
bicycles, and therefore also tricycles, are not "vehicles." Most impor-
tantly, (3) the legislative history demonstrates that Congress was using
"vehicle" in its prototypical sense, meaning motorized mechanisms like
the one that ran into Giannotto. The legislature's concern with safety
suggests, consistent with the statutory structure, the following range of
prohibitions: motor vehicles are barred because their size or speed ren-
ders them hazardous; bicycles are allowed but regulated for safe han-
dling because they can be hazardous; and tricycles are allowed because
their small size and slow speed render them relatively safe. The inter-
2 This conventional wisdom is adapted from William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (igo). For empirical sup-
port, see Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 340-41 (2ooi); and Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use
of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 7o TEX. L. REV. 1073 (1992).
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preter might check this last rule against (4) the agency's pattern of
(non)enforcement and evidence of private reliance on that pattern, as
well as (5) current facts: have tricycles been causing accidents in the
parks? If there remains any doubt, (6) it should be resolved against
the prosecutor, according to the rule of lenity. Also, a court should not
strain to criminalize activities engaged in mainly by young children.
The Case of the Tricycle illustrates the virtues of the traditional
approach. First, it yields predictable answers in all but the hardest
cases. This is a rule-of-law advantage. Second, this approach respects
the Congress that enacted the law. By consulting legislative history,
judges see how legislators used language (like "vehicle"), what prob-
lems they were trying to solve and what purposes they were pursuing,
and perhaps what deals were made to enact the law. This is a democ-
racy advantage. Third, the traditional approach considers the reason-
able expectations of those subject to the statute, as well as the factual
and normative context for applying the statute. This is a fairness ad-
vantage: statutes will not be applied in ways that are unreasonable.
Notwithstanding these virtues, the traditional approach has come
under fire in the last generation. Speaking for an increasingly numer-
ous band of judges and law professors, Justice Scalia's new textualism
urges judges to ignore Items (3) and (5), legislative history and evolut-
ive sources. 3  He believes these sources create opportunities for too
much judicial discretion, allowing judges to "look over the heads of the
crowd and pick out [their] friends."'4 Professor Adrian Vermeule now
argues for a newer and more parsimonious textualism. In Judging
Under Uncertainty, he maintains that judges should (4) follow agency
interpretations unless clearly inconsistent with (i) the plain meaning of
the statutory provisions on point. For the most part, judges should ig-
nore Items (2)-(3) 5 and defer to agencies as to Items (5)-(6).6
The purpose of this Review is to situate Professor Vermeule's "no
frills" textualism historically and to evaluate its cogency.7 Part I iden-
tifies previous statutory theorists who have anticipated the institution-
alist methodology and the central argument in Judging Under Uncer-
3 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
4 SCALIA, supra note 3, at 36.
5 Professor Vermeule would exclude "related statutes" (pp. 202-04) and would consider only
the "directly dispositive clauses or provisions at hand" (p. 204), apparently excluding most in-
tratextual analysis.
6 Although resort to linguistic canons and some substantive canons is inevitable (p. 200),
agencies, not courts, should pick the canonical default rules (p. 2oi). This approach would col-
lapse (6) normative sources into (4) precedential ones.
7 Professor Vermeule also offers a no frills theory of judicial review, urging federal judges to
defer to legislative judgments about constitutional limits in all but the clearest cases (pp. 23o-88).
Due to space constraints, this Review will focus on the statutory interpretation theory.
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tainty - that agencies and not judges should enjoy primacy in statu-
tory interpretation. Professor Vermeule is much more dismissive of
judicial capabilities and more enthusiastic about agency lawmaking
than earlier theorists, however. Rejecting the relevance of constitu-
tional norms and traditional practice, he argues that the country will
save money and enjoy better policy decisions if federal judges ratify
agency rules unless they are flatly inconsistent with statutory text read
through the lens of agency-approved principles of interpretation.
Professor Vermeule presents his case for a no frills textualism in an
engaging, sometimes brilliant, but ultimately unpersuasive way. His
argument fails to consider important constitutional norms (Part II of
this Review) and the full range of institutional consequences of such a
significant change in judicial practice (Part III). There is also reason
to doubt whether his proposed methodology would actually induce
judges to be more deferential to good agency decisions; the results are
essentially unpredictable (section IV.C). If it actually had an effect on
judicial decisions, no frills textualism would be just as likely to gener-
ate significant costs by tolerating bad agency decisions (section IV.A),
encouraging policy instability (section IV.B), and unmooring statutory
policy from legislative purposes (Part V). It also would alter the shape
of judicial reasoning, making its presentation more mechanical and
less normative than it is now (Part VI). This last feature, however,
might yield advantages for no frills textualism from some perspectives.
I. THREE INSTITUTIONAL TURNS: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION SCHOLARSHIP, 1915-2005
The primary theoretical claim of Judging Under Uncertainty is that
statutory interpretation must be grounded upon a proper appreciation
of institutional capabilities (pp. I5-16). Professor Vermeule suggests
that previous statutory interpretation theorists have been beset by
various "blindnesses" to institutional context: philosophers such as Pro-
fessor Ronald Dworkin ignore institutional capability questions; legal
process theorists like Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks rely
upon stylized assumptions about institutions; and pragmatists such as
Judge Richard Posner and I take a realistic view of legislatures but
romanticize courts. Professor Vermeule dismisses all three groups of
vision-impaired theorists: philosophy is too abstract to yield answers to
methodological questions; traditional process theory is in need of a re-
alistic, preferably empirically based, understanding of the relevant in-
stitutions; and pragmatists must yield to theories that better appreciate
the incapacities of courts (pp. i6-i8). To overthrow these blind ap-
proaches, Professor Vermeule announces an "institutional turn" in
2044 [V01. 119:2041
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statutory interpretation theory (p. 63). 8 His precise institutional analy-
sis would require courts to defer to agencies on issues of statutory in-
terpretation, except in cases in which the agency construction violates
the plain meaning of the statutory provision.
The institutional turn started almost a century ago, with the recog-
nition that judges should consider relative institutional competence
when interpreting statutes or even the common law.9 As early as 1918,
Justice Brandeis argued that judges were incapable of making compli-
cated policy judgments and should defer to the policy lines drawn by
legislatures. 10 During the New Deal, Dean James Landis maintained
that legislatures should delegate most statutory line-drawing to agen-
cies and that judges should defer to lines drawn by administrators. 1 '
The next generation of theorists developed the details of a legal process
theory for the modern regulatory state: government is purposive, for it
exists to solve social problems, and legislation has replaced judicial de-
cisions as our primary source of law, with agencies supplanting courts
as the primary elaborators of regulatory norms.12 The Hart and Sacks
materials on The Legal Process grew out of this theorizing.
Contrary to Professor Vermeule, these early theorists were far from
institutionally blind. It is particularly unfair for him to say that Pro-
fessor Hart wrote about legislatures, courts, and agencies in "stereo-
typed, stylized" ways "that correspond only hazily to the facts of
American government" (p. i7). A top official in the Office of Price
Administration during World War II, Professor Hart wrote from deep
firsthand knowledge of agencies as well as courts. The Legal Process
accepted the "shortcomings" of adjudication and tried to lay a "founda-
tion for an understanding of the frequent need for ... one of the more
sophisticated types of administered regulation."'1 3 The legal process
materials are filled with problems reflecting the primary role of legisla-
tures in policymaking and agencies in law elaboration. Unlike many
recent scholars, the authors engaged in serious, reliable investigation
8 See also Adrian Vermeule, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and the Institutional Turn,
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 3, http:/lwww.bepress.com/ils/iSS3/art3.
9 A precise history can be found in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical
and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li,
lix-lxii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (tent. ed. 1958).
10 See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
11 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938).
12 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at lxix-lxxvii (discussing the unpublished materials
developed by Professors Willard Hurst and Henry Hart).
13 HART & SACKS, supra note 9, at 342.
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into how things actually operate in the real world of legislated statutes
and agency regulations.
14
To be sure, legal process theory has not been static since Professor
Hart. Scholars in the 197os and I98os were more critical of the ca-
pacities of legislatures and agencies to create public-regarding rules.
Most of these scholars advocated an activist role for federal judges to
correct dysfunctions in the modern regulatory state through represen-
tation-reinforcing judicial review,' 5 dynamic judicial interpretations,
16
and hard-look review of agency rules and interpretations. 1 7  In the
198os and 199os, however, some scholars returned to the older legal
process point that courts are structurally limited in their ability to
handle polycentric problems. Accordingly, these authors argued that
judicial review is often wasteful or counterproductive; 8 they also ad-
vocated more cautious statutory interpretation and greater judicial
deference to agency decisionmaking and interpretation. 19
Judging Under Uncertainty extends this strand of traditional legal
process theory, with a more forceful institutionalist criticism of courts.
Professor Vermeule charges a variety of scholars with the fallacy of
"nirvana" (romanticizing judicial capabilities) (pp. 40-59). Ironically,
he levels the charge primarily at scholars who have developed some of
the most detailed critiques of judicial performance.2 0 Because he
thinks federal judges should abandon most of their independent role in
statutory interpretation and should defer more to agencies, Professor
Vermeule (even more than Justice Scalia) would deny judges access to
contextual materials and limit their jobs to applying surface meanings
of statutory and constitutional texts. Yet he offers little empirical or
theoretical reason to think that unmonitored agencies will be good for
the country, and the book as a whole suffers from "agency nirvana."
Legal scholarship took a second institutional turn in the wake of
the civil rights revolution. Early legal process scholars said little about
14 See, e.g., id. at io-68 (an excellent treatment of agency rulemaking and the primary role it
plays); id. at 1271-1312 (discussion of deference courts owe to decisions when agencies have supe-
rior expertise); see also id. at 696-1007 (detailed treatment of legislation).
15 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (i98o).
16 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987).
17 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667 (975).
18 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (i9gi).
19 See, e.g., R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 245, 258 (i992); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, i J.L. ECON. & ORG. 8i, 91-99 (1985).
20 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 8i-
io9, 161-73 (I994); Richard A. Posner, Reply, The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Con-
stitutional Interpretation, ioi MICH. L. REV. 952 (2003).
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the legitimacy issues involved in the operation of our government.
They ignored or underappreciated the pervasive subordination of
women and minorities. Their instrumentalist approach was an insuffi-
cient framework once people of color, women, and gay people insisted
upon their integration into full and equal national citizenship. The in-
dignities and violence suffered by these Americans, endorsed by the
state and sometimes carried out by state officials, threatened the le-
gitimacy of the government itself.
2 1
The desegregation cases changed the face of American jurispru-
dence. A post-1950s generation of "new legal process" scholars insisted
that state legitimacy is not just a function of competent institutions
acting under the proper procedures, but also requires meaningful par-
ticipation by all groups and the integration of equality and other
norms into public law.2 2 Most of these second-turn scholars have been
openly progressive, constitutionalizing a vision of a more just and mul-
ticultural America, but others have developed different normative
groundings for statutory interpretation. Professor John Manning, for
example, maintains that a textualist understanding of statutory inter-
pretation is mandated by the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution and perhaps by the
Framers' understanding of the "judicial Power" in Article I1I.23
In this spirit, Professor Jeremy Waldron's Law and Disagreement
argues that the legitimacy-conferring features of deliberation in legisla-
tures suggest that judges should follow a textualist approach to statu-
tory interpretation and should abandon judicial review altogether.
24
Judging Under Uncertainty has similar punchlines, although it is a lit-
tle more radical in its prescriptions for statutory interpretation (Profes-
sor Waldron would retain holistic and normative sources) and a little
less radical for constitutional interpretation (Professor Vermeule would
21 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
(ig8g) (suggesting the illegitimacy of government that ignores the needs of female citizens);
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944) (discussing legitimacy challenges posed by
American apartheid); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 195o's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
561 (ig88).
22 See, e.g., Daniel A. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV.
919 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1988)); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Stat-
utes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89
MICH. L. REV. 707 (199i).
23 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, ioi COLUM. L. REV.
(2001); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 695-
706 (I997).
24 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (iggg); cf. Jeremy Waldron, Legisla-
tion, Authority, and Voting, 84 GEO. L.J. 2185 (1996) (defending legislation as an authoritative,
reasoned, and nonarbitrary source of law).
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allow courts to apply plain constitutional texts). Theoretically, how-
ever, the two books are worlds apart. Professor Waldron grounds ju-
dicial interpretation in a process norm - the conditions of politics and
majority-decision process that inspire even the losers to obey the law.
In contrast, Professor Vermeule dismisses questions of state legitimacy
as well as constitutional norms and revives the instrumentalism char-
acteristic of earlier legal process thinkers. He believes the constitu-
tional debate will never produce workable guidelines for judges (pp.
32-34). We should give up, then, on first-order arguments about
proper statutory methodology and engage in a frank institutional cost-
benefit calculation - not unlike the one pioneered in the 192o0s and
193OS, but carried out in a more sophisticated way. Unfortunately,
Professor Vermeule gives no satisfactory defense for ignoring norma-
tive analysis and legitimacy concerns.
Such cost-benefit analysis is related to a third institutional turn,
which draws from economics and game theory to model the complex
costs and benefits of judicial and agency law elaboration.25 Professors
Hart and Sacks modeled institutions as cooperating to carry out im-
portant collective projects; subsequent scholars saw courts as correct-
ing for the dysfunctions of other institutions. Third-turn theorists have
considered a broader range of institutional consequences that could
follow from different approaches the Supreme Court might bring to
statutory interpretation. Some scholars have suggested that several of
the substantive canons of statutory construction can be defended as
forcing democratic or legislative deliberation about important public
law issues, such as what crimes there should be and their appropriate
punishments.2 6 Others have suggested that the Court's still-extensive
reliance on legislative history creates massive costs for agencies, law
firms, and litigants that might not be justified by the benefits gener-
ated by reliance on such history.27 Also writing in the third-turn mode,
Professor James Brudney responds that institutional costs of legislative
history reliance must be balanced against benefits, notably Congress's
ability to manage its lawmaking agenda efficiently and to deliberate
25 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-50 (1994); Symposium, Positive Political The-
ory and Public Law (pts. I & 2), 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 1737 (1992).
26 Under the rule of lenity, narrow constructions are likely to trigger congressional review and
updating of criminal statutes; broad constructions constitute judicial lawmaking in a sensitive
area and are unlikely to be reviewed by Congress. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Su-
preme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, soi YALE L.J. 331, 361-62, 413-14 (I99I). For
other examples in which the Court elicits congressional responses, see id. at 388-89; and Einer
Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002).
27 See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 36-37; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 685. But see Ira C. Lupu,
Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324, 1325-26 (1998) (re-
sponding to a subsequent, more elaborate version of my original cost-benefit argument).
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effectively in the face of finite resources."' Justices who ignore legisla-
tive history contribute to ideologically polarized results that frustrate
Congress's goals and expectations.
29
Third-turn authors approach institutional cost-benefit analysis in a
more systematic way than earlier legal process thinkers did. Professor
Neil Komesar, for example, argues that judicial decisionmaking is lim-
ited by the structure of adjudication, the kinds of parties who will liti-
gate, and the constrained resources of the court system. 30 He does not
draw any conclusions for statutory interpretation, but others have de-
ployed his approach to do so. Dismissing Congress as gridlocked and
courts as incompetent to make complex policy judgments, Professor
Frank Cross maintains that agencies alone are capable of updating
public policy in a rational and expeditious way.31 Judging Under Un-
certainty seeks to implement Professor Cross's "agencies should govern
the country" policy by narrowing the range of sources judges can in-
voke to override agency interpretations.
Is there a factual basis for believing that more agency lawmaking is
good for the country and that no frills textualism would free agencies
from excessive judicial intervention? As to the latter inquiry, the lead-
ing empirical analyses suggest, provisionally, that a narrow textualism
(as opposed to the traditional approach) threatens to undermine the
rule of law, legislative expectations, and even agency efficacy.32  Pro-
fessor Vermeule disregards these analyses (pp. 159-62), yet his book in-
troduces no fresh empirical evidence. How do you conduct an institu-
28 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. i, 20-40 (1994).
29 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV 1, 78-95, 1o8-1i (2005).
30 See KOMESAR, supra note 25, at 123-50.
31 See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemak-
ing, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2ooo); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2ooo).
32 See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 29, at 6-7 (arguing that the outcomes of workplace-
related cases in which Justices relied on canons of construction to the exclusion of legislative his-
tory "suggest that the canons are regularly used in an instrumental if not ideologically conscious
manner," casting doubt on claims that textualism "can promote either impartiality or consistency
in judicial reasoning"); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 109 (994) (suggesting, based on preliminary analysis, that judicial
deference to agency decisions is driven in part by Supreme Court Justices' policy preferences);
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, ioi YALE L.J. 969, 990-93 (1992)
(suggesting that, in using a textualist approach, Justices would "dramatically transform Chevron
from a deference doctrine to a doctrine of antideference" and in fact did not often defer to agency
interpretations in post-Chevron cases); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Leg-
islative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 597-6o5 (2002) (finding
that congressional drafters generally do not consider and often are unaware of the textual and
substantive canons the Court uses).
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tional cost-benefit analysis when you have, essentially, no usable data
about costs and benefits?
Professor Vermeule's ingenious answer is to admit that we are clue-
less and then turn to theories that guide individual decisionmakers act-
ing under conditions of uncertainty. He starts with the principle of in-
sufficient reason (pp. 173-75), developed to model events, such as a
coin flip, for which no reasonable evidence exists that would favor one
outcome over another.33 Under this principle, judges interpreting stat-
utes might assume that both the costs and benefits of considering (2)
collateral statutes, (3) legislative history, and (6) substantive norms are
substantial and indeterminate in each case, and that therefore the costs
equal the benefits. This move does not tell us whether judges should
consider other statutory texts, legislative history, and substantive can-
ons, but it has the effect of rendering the available data irrelevant.
Next, Professor Vermeule invokes the "maximin" criterion, under
which decisionmakers maximize the minimum payoff, namely, the net
benefit under worst-case assumptions (pp. 175-76). He argues that the
traditional approach to statutory interpretation yields a lot of judicial
errors and incurs a large social expense (researching legislative history
and other things). This is inferior to a no frills approach of sticking to
the surface meaning of clear and specific text; with no frills textualism,
there will still be judicial errors, but much less social expense. Profes-
sor Vermeule supports the maximin conclusion with other theories of
decisionmaking under uncertainty: "satisficing" (choosing the first
available alternative that is "good enough") (pp. 176-79), just picking
something (pp. 179-8o), and "fast-and-frugal heuristics" (pp. 18o-81).
Overall, the institutional calculus reflects an underlying (but unde-
fended) assumption that "[i]nflexible, rule-bound behavior is often the
best response" when "the decisionmaker has very poor information or
a very low capacity to process the information" (p. 285). 3 4  It is also
unclear whether theories of individual decisionmaking under uncer-
tainty should be applied to institutional decisionmaking.
This deployment of decision theory is the most original feature of
Judging Under Uncertainty. Does it justify an interpretive revolution?
As I argue in Parts II and III, the book offers no persuasive reason to
abandon traditional normative criteria for debating statutory method-
ology. Its institutional cost-benefit analysis suffers from unrealistic op-
33 For a general discussion of the principle of insufficient reason, see Hans-Werner Sinn, A
Rehabilitation of the Principle of Insufficient Reason, 94 Q.J. ECON. 493 (i98o).
34 Professor Vermeule draws this assumption from Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predict-
able Behavior, 73 AM. EcON. REV. 560 (1983), which argues that, theoretically, simple rules pro-
duce more predictable behavior than complex standards. I know of no empirical support for this
hypothesis, and Professor Heiner does not suggest that his insight applies to institutional compe-
tence issues. Part II of this Review questions whether no frills textualism produces simple rules.
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timism about the utility of a no frills, agency-deferring approach, as
discussed in Part IV, and from unrealistic pessimism about judicial
ability to handle legislative materials, as shown in Part V. Yet I sug-
gest in Part VI and in the Conclusion that there may be a number of
potential institutional advantages to a regime of no frills textualism,
especially as applied to certain kinds of statutes.
II. SHOULD COURTS IGNORE THE CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC
NORMS WHEN THEY INTERPRET STATUTES?
Law is saturated with concerns of legitimacy and social morality.
When the judge interprets the Vehicles in the Park statute, she is pro-
nouncing a judgment that not only reflects social morality as deliber-
ated and voted upon by the legislature, but also constitutes our na-
tion's public morality. To reduce statutory interpretation to an
institutional cost-benefit analysis threatens, especially in criminal
cases, to anesthetize an arena of public inquiry that is relentlessly
moral, normative, and socially constitutive. If constitutional principle
or meaning supports a certain methodology, that methodology ought to
be the presumptive baseline for federal judges. Indeed, Professor
Vermeule provides an argument for this precept. He says that courts
should defer to Congress's understanding of the Constitution so as to
encourage legislators to focus on the constitutional limits of their au-
thority (pp. 235-36, 246, 259-62). The same reasoning suggests that
federal courts should focus on the constitutional limits of and guide-
lines for their exercise of Article III's "judicial Power" when they for-
mulate a general approach to statutory interpretation.
Several constitutional principles suggest weaknesses in the no frills
textualist approach. Professor Manning, for example, maintains that
the Constitution's procedures for lawmaking and the Framers' under-
standing of the "judicial Power" require a more contextual textualism,
one that considers holistic and normative sources.3 5 Professor Ver-
meule relies on my constitutional work to dismiss these arguments as
ultimately indeterminate (pp. 32-33), but my debate with Professor
Manning about the original meaning of Article III is most notable for
our agreements. We both find that the Framers expected judges to
consider not just the plain meaning of statutory texts, but also reason-
able meaning (in light of statutory purpose), the common law, constitu-
tional norms, substantive canons of statutory construction, and the
whole act as well as related statutory provisions.36 Professor Vermeule
35 See sources cited supra note 23.
36 William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-18o6, I01 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); John F. Manning, Deriving
Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, ioi COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1652-58
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would give most of this contextual evidence a heave-ho, without any
constitutional analysis.
Justice Breyer argues that the Constitution's commitment to repre-
sentative democracy supports the traditional approach.3 7  This argu-
ment also speaks to the legitimacy of judicial practice. Even most tex-
tualists insist that judges must behave as faithful agents of con-
gressional majorities. Professor Vermeule considers this kind of
argument, as he does the original meaning debate, too abstract to
guide judges in selecting an approach to statutory interpretation, but
Justice Breyer's prescriptions are supported by deep experience in pub-
lic administration and by recent empirical evidence. Systematically
surveying workplace-related cases, Professors Brudney and Corey Dit-
slear find that the most conservative Justices (such as Scalia) deploy
plain meaning canons to trump legislative expectations with their own
pro-employer or pro-market preferences, while more liberal Justices
(such as Breyer) respect congressional preferences more often, in part
because they consider legislative materials. 38 Thus, when the more lib-
eral Justices rely on legislative history, that history disproportionately
leads them to conservative results. 39 These findings constitute pre-
liminary evidence that the traditional approach encourages judges to
accord due respect to democratic deliberation and that abandoning the
traditional approach may contribute to less-fettered judicial activism.
Finally, the Constitution commits the judiciary to particular norms
of fairness. The Federalists who defended Article III emphasized the
role life-tenured judges would play in combating the evils of "unjust
and partial laws" through ameliorative interpretations, as well as
through invalidation. 40 This is a norm of substantive fairness. Other
constitutional provisions instruct judges to be procedurally fair. Inter-
preting a vague criminal law to penalize conduct not clearly within the
legislature's or citizens' reasonable expectations of what is proscribed
would contravene the Due Process Clause's directive to judges. If the
law were applied in a discriminatory way, it would raise concerns un-
der the Equal Protection Clause.
(2001). Other serious historical inquiries have agreed that the Framers expected judges to inter-
pret statutes by reference to context. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the
Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural
Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-41 (2000).
37 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 85-101 (2oo5).
38 See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 29, at 57-69, 77-95.
39 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Pat-
terns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 227
(2oo6).
40 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., I96I), discussed
in Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1049-53.
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The Case of the Tricycle illustrates the importance of constitutional
guideposts when federal judges interpret criminal statutes. Constitu-
tional principle requires judges to consider the compromises Congress
made when it enacted the Vehicles in the Park statute, and a judge
cannot fully appreciate those compromises unless she considers the
context of the statute, including the I96O law that was the backdrop
for the i98o legislation, the explanation of the deal in the committee
reports, and the statute's purpose. A quick-and-dirty textualism that
screens out such evidence is in tension not only with Article I, Section
7 of the Constitution and with democracy norms, but also with the due
process and equal protection norms underlying the rule of lenity. It is
illegitimate to apply the statute to the tricycle perp because she did not
have adequate notice that her activity was criminal and, more deeply,
because our elected representatives did not aim the moral force of the
criminal law against this child.
However grounded, the legitimacy of exercising state power against
citizens is highly relevant even under Professor Vermeule's instrumen-
talist assumptions. An institutional cost-benefit analysis must consider
potential loss-of-legitimacy costs. Citizens expect the exercise of state
power to proceed under the positive terms and conditions set by the
Constitution, they expect criminal laws to be limited to those offenses
clearly targeted for moral sanction by the legislature, and they expect
dignified treatment from the state.4 1 A state that arrests and detains a
tricycle-riding girl under a statute not aimed at her is a state whose le-
gitimacy is potentially in peril. If that state followed with further ar-
rests of skateboarders, roller skaters, and even parents pushing baby
carriages (all of which could be justified under a no frills textualism),
the legitimacy of the criminal law and perhaps of the rule of law itself
would decline over time. Such gargantuan social costs would dwarf
the benefits Professor Vermeule claims for his approach.
In addition, without a theory of state legitimacy, Professor Ver-
meule has no metric for determining whether an interpretation is good
or bad. Sometimes, Judging Under Uncertainty seems to assume that
inexpensive judicial decisionmaking is an end in itself (p. 287). If that
end carried enough weight, there would be no role for judicial review
of agency interpretations at all, or the role might be carried out by
summary opinions or even by flipping coins. Elsewhere, the book as-
sumes that an interpretation is good if it is formulated by the institu-
tion most competent to make such decisions (p. 2). But determining
which institution is most competent requires normative as well as em-
41 For empirically grounded work arguing that state legitimacy depends importantly on indi-
viduated treatment of people's rights and perceived neutrality, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 45-56, 94-112 (199o); and Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy,
I PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 323 (i997).
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pirical assessments: Do courts make more "mistakes" than agencies?
How does one determine whether a decision is mistaken without the
kind of "high-level conceptual commitments" (p. 2) that Professor
Vermeule avoids?
III. DOES DECISION THEORY SUPPORT A RADICAL
TRANSFORMATION OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE?
Assume that constitutional baselines are not relevant and that some
sort of institutional cost-benefit analysis should be deployed to pick a
theory of statutory interpretation. Assume, in addition, the more plau-
sible proposition that the traditional approach to statutory interpreta-
tion imposes substantial but indeterminate costs, including judicial er-
rors (however they might be determined) and substantial research
expenses. Professor Vermeule admits that replacing the traditional ap-
proach with his no frills textualism would also impose substantial but
indeterminate costs on our legal system.
Under these assumptions, it is hard to understand why theories of
decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty require us to throw
over the traditional approach for no frills textualism. Even if the prin-
ciple of insufficient reason were to kick in, and the costs of the tradi-
tional approach and the no frills approach were assumed to be the
same, we would have a tie. Faced with this situation, we should stick
with the traditional approach to statutory interpretation. This has the
following advantages: no transition costs (p. 266), the endowment ef-
fect that goes with an established status quo, and proven legitimacy
under rule-of-law, democracy, and fairness criteria. Because the
weight federal courts give to legislative history has varied somewhat
from era to era, Professor Vermeule denies that there is a "status quo"
in federal statutory interpretation (pp. I9O-9I). But his book asks only
what sources can be considered when federal judges interpret statutes.
At such a general level, there is a longstanding status quo: five of the
six sources identified above have been staples of American statutory
interpretation since the founding era,42 and the sixth (legislative his-
tory) has been a staple for the last hundred years or more.
43
Maximin also supports the traditional approach. We have every
reason to believe that the minimum payoff of the status quo is signifi-
42 See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT. THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 31-57 (1999); Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1009-30, 1058-82.
43 See Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69
TEX. L. REV 1001, lO68-84 (i99
I
) (describing nineteenth-century use of legislative background
to interpret statutes). While the Court's use of legislative history has "waxed and waned" in the
last century (p. 191), the number of citations is not the point. Since the New Deal, legislative his-
tory has been an essential source of statutory meaning. For several generations, it has been legal
malpractice for a Supreme Court brief to ignore relevant legislative history.
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cant and positive, because the traditional approach has worked satis-
factorily for decades. 44  It has served the country well, albeit with
great legal research costs. The drastic step of reeducating judges and
attorneys in no frills textualism seems unnecessary unless there is some
statutory interpretation disaster - something beyond "this costs a lot
of money and does not always reach the right answer." Ironically, the
primary example Professor Vermeule provides of an incorrect statutory
interpretation under the traditional approach is a Supreme Court deci-
sion handed down I14 years ago, in a case that I think was correctly
decided (discussed below in Part V). Such an old and problematic ex-
ample does not stir the heart to support a revolution.
Following the maximin criterion, contrast the worst-case scenario
for no frills textualism: the Supreme Court hands down a series of ri-
diculous decisions, such as applying the Vehicles in the Park statute to
tricycle riders, skateboarders, and parents pushing baby carriages;
these decisions undermine the trust We the People have that the Court
will apply the rule of law sensibly. A legal system hemorrhaging le-
gitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Americans and their legislators is the
kind of public nightmare that aggressive textualism might deliver.
This is worse than anything the traditional approach has produced in
the last century or is likely to produce in the current one.45
To be sure, I do not think the worst-case scenario would occur, be-
cause even a Court adventurous enough to adopt Professor Vermeule's
theory would not be bold enough to apply it rigorously, and surely
lower courts would not. In the Case of the Tricycle, many Vermeulean
judges would not convict the little girl, even though the statute defines
"vehicle" broadly enough to include a tricycle and even if the adminis-
tering agency insisted upon that plain meaning. These judges would
consult the bicycle statute, peek into the legislative history, and smug-
gle in lenity concerns against aggressive constructions of this criminal
statute. Inspired by any of these (disapproved) sources, the reasonable
judge could overrule the police by announcing that the statute is lim-
ited to motorized transport. And the judge could justify her no frills
44 Lawyers are quick to complain when legal institutions do not work. In response to the
Court's traditional approach to statutory interpretation, the lawyers' silence is deafening.
45 Professor Vermeule's other decisionmaking guidelines also support the status quo. A satis-
ficing decisionmaker who stops looking when she has found a strategy that is good enough for
government work (pp. 176-77) can stop with the traditional approach. If it was good enough for
Justices John Harlan, Lewis Powell, and Sandra Day O'Connor, then it is good enough for the
Roberts Court. Likewise, the strategy of picking an approach (p. i79) seems tailor-made for stick-
ing with the status quo. The most obvious and familiar box on the shelves is the traditional ap-
proach, and the busy shopper is likely to pick it and proceed to checkout.
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decision by shopping for support in various dictionaries, among lin-
guists, and in other approved sources.
46
Hence, no frills textualism could rapidly become just as compli-
cated and costly as the traditional approach has become. Rather than
dueling over the weight to be given to particular committee report
language, advocates and judges could duel over etymology, syntax and
grammar, and the ordinary usage of language - topics that are poten-
tially just as complicated as legislative history.47 No frills textualism
would also produce a cottage industry of increasingly complicated le-
gal doctrine pertaining to the stare decisis effect of pre-revolution deci-
sions, the kind of agency interpretations entitled to deference, and
other issues. If many lower court judges surreptitiously consulted leg-
islative history, the practice of statutory interpretation in the federal
system could become less predictable as well. Accordingly, even a bet-
ter-case scenario for no frills textualism could be costlier than the
worst-case scenario for the status quo.
Invoking insufficient reason, maximin, and satisficing, Professor
Vermeule reaches completely different conclusions (pp. 192-95). But
he does so by ignoring the (potential) costs of his approach and over-
stating its (probable) benefits. Thus, he makes the following maximin
argument:
If legislative history is excluded the worst possible outcome is that the
judges will get statutory cases wrong with indeterminate frequency. If leg-
islative history is consulted the worst possible outcome is that the judges
get statutory cases wrong with indeterminate frequency, and the enormous
expense of legislative-history research will be incurred. (p. 194)
This is an almost comical way of stating the balance. If legislative his-
tory sources were excluded, the worst possible outcome would be more
judicial errors caused by the failure to consider congressional compro-
mises, greater imposition upon the limited congressional agenda, di-
minished legitimacy of the Court's statutory jurisprudence, and more
costs associated with the dictionary-shopping and expert linguist re-
ports that would replace the excluded legislative history in judicial
opinions, and everyone would still look at legislative history. Professor
Vermeule would not accept this cost-benefit analysis, but my point is
that his decision-theory mechanism is so manipulable and unencum-
46 Dictionary shopping is already proliferating. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dic-
tionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Samuel A. Thumma & Jef-
frey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use
of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999).
47 Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127-32 (1998) (interpreting "carries a
firearm" by reference to dictionaries and an online survey of use in magazines), with id. at 142-44
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (responding with references to the Bible, literature, and the TV show
M*A*S*H).
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bered by empirical or other supporting evidence that it could support
any approach to statutory interpretation - and hence, supports none
persuasively.
IV. WOULD NO FRILLS TEXTUALISM ALLOW AGENCIES
GREATER FREEDOM FROM JUDICIAL MEDDLING?
DO WE WANT THAT?
Professor Vermeule's central institutional claim is that federal
courts should step down in statutory cases and leave agencies substan-
tially free to apply statutes as they see fit, subject to plain meaning re-
strictions (pp. 198-229). This is a stronger version of the thesis that
Professors Jerry Mashaw, Edward Rubin, and Frank Cross have been
suggesting for two decades. 48 Compared with judicial lawmaking,
agency lawmaking has much to recommend it. First, it can make the
rule of law more predictable: agencies can flesh out statutory standards
with detailed rulemaking, and their rules have immediate national ap-
plication, unlike the slower process of circuit-by-circuit adjudication
by federal courts. Second, agencies have access to experts and deep
experience in applying the statutes they are charged with enforcing.
Hence, they often make better policy choices than either judges or leg-
islators. For me, agencies are particularly attractive, because they can
update statutes more rapidly and often more effectively than judges
can. Third, agencies are typically more democratically accountable
than judges. Their dynamic applications of statutes are subject to
congressional oversight and budget pressures and are thus more likely
to reflect current legislative preferences than judicial dynamism.
49
Professor Vermeule presses agency-driven statutory interpretation
much harder than Professors Mashaw and Rubin do. Under his the-
ory, judges must defer to agency interpretations unless they violate the
plain meaning of a statutory provision, judges may not consult legisla-
tive history or related statutes to override agency interpretations, and
agencies set canonical rules for construing their own statutes. Profes-
sor Vermeule maintains that no frills textualism, combined with strong
agency deference, would be a Magna Carta for the modern administra-
tive state - freeing Americans from those pesky and incompetent
judges so that agency experts can give us the efficient public-regarding
rules we deserve.
This exciting hypothesis remains unproven. Professor Vermeule as-
sumes that judges often override good agency interpretations and im-
pose significant and unnecessary costs on government. But he never
48 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 31; Mashaw, supra note Ig; Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legisla-
tion in the Administrative State, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 369 (1989).
49 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
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makes clear the criteria that describe what a good agency interpreta-
tion is and does not demonstrate that political agencies ought to be lib-
erated from searching judicial review. Judging Under Uncertainty suf-
fers from what might be called an "agency nirvana" fallacy in general.
Moreover, there is no connection between the perceived problem and
the proposed solution. There is no reason to believe that judges apply-
ing no frills textualism will override only bad agency interpretations or
that the country would be better off (whatever that might mean) if
agencies were less strictly monitored. No frills textualism, if seriously
implemented, could just as easily be the Treaty of Versailles (which ini-
tially appeared to bring peace but ultimately set the stage for World
War II) as the Magna Carta of the modern state.
A. The Agency Nirvana Problem
Following Professor Cross, Professor Vermeule assumes that the
country would be better off if judges essentially left agencies alone, ex-
cept when agency lawmaking violates a statute's plain meaning.
There is a significant literature examining problems with agency law-
making, and it is a needed corrective for the agency nirvana fallacy at
the heart of Judging Under Uncertainty. The status quo, which allows
federal judges to review agency interpretations under traditional crite-
ria, is far from perfect but does offer a workable system for setting
limits on dynamic agency interpretations such as Commissioner
Rover's aggressive stance toward tricycular traffic in federal parksAs°
Stated another way, there are significant problems with a legal system
that leaves agency interpretations essentially unmonitored.
First, there is a problem of agency bias. Some agencies, at least
some of the time, exhibit features of capture by the interests they are
supposed to be regulating.5 1 The National Labor Relations Board is
one example.5 2 Many factors can contribute to agency capture, includ-
ing postgovernment employment opportunities, the agency's need for
industry cooperation, and political pressure from the White House and
congressional subcommittees. The capture scenario is dynamic. Some
agencies, like the EPA, have been able to resist capture under some
50 For an institutional cost-benefit analysis supporting the traditional approach, see, for exam-
ple, Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation To Improve the Legislative Process: Can It
Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 141-6o (1997).
51 See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
(ig81); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167 (199o) (providing
an overview of the capture literature).
52 See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26
COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 243-52 (2005).
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administrations, only to succumb under others.5 3 If agencies are cap-
tured by special interests, agency interpretations are unlikely to reflect
the larger public interest upon which regulatory statutes are grounded.
Because life-tenured federal judges typically have no post-judicial job
aspirations, do not develop deep day-to-day connections with the par-
ties before them, and are not as responsive to normal politics, they are
in a good position to review agency interpretations that either disre-
gard or distort congressionally established policy guidelines5 4  This
observation does not suggest, however, that judges will always have
the opportunity to review biased agency decisions or will exercise the
best judgment in those cases. My point is that by ignoring the agency
bias problem and the possibility that judicial review can ameliorate
that problem, Professor Vermeule's institutional cost-benefit model re-
flects an agency nirvana that is not always realistic.
55
Even uncaptured agencies will often bend statutes to suit their in-
stitutional interests instead of the public interest. Agencies tend to ex-
pand their authority, and the most public-regarding agencies are often
the most aggressive turf grabbers.5 6 Although Commissioner Rover in
the Case of the Tricycle may be admirable in his zeal to clean up fed-
eral parks, we need not defer to his text-based interpretation of the
Vehicles in the Park law. One of the virtues of the rule of lenity is that
it slows down aggressive police and assures citizens that their liberties
will not be curtailed without legislative deliberation. For similar rea-
sons, Chevron57 should not and probably does not require deference to
an agency's claims about its own jurisdiction.
58
A second problem is that even uncaptured expert decisionmakers
might benefit from outside monitoring. The most public-regarding
agency will make standard decisionmaking errors that are exacerbated
by agency officials' reliance on their own expertise. Professor Mark
Seidenfeld argues that agencies systematically fall prey to overconfi-
dence, egocentrism, and other cognitive heuristics characteristic of ex-
53 See, e.g., Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Friends in the White House Come to
Coal's Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at Ai (describing a new policy of calling upon industry lob-
byists to revise environmental regulations developed by EPA experts). Indeed, the second Bush
Administration seems to be a hotbed of agency capture. See Theodore W. Ruger, Left to Their
Own Devices, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 24 (arguing that the FDA, long considered an ex-
emplary agency, is being captured by drug manufacturers).
54 See Stewart, supra note 17. But cf Spence & Cross, supra note 31, at 12 1-22 (arguing that
interest groups prefer judicial review to agency decisionmaking).
55 Professor Vermeule discusses principal-agent problems in general (pp. 69-70, 77-78, 209)
but neither cites the extensive literature on agency capture nor incorporates it into his analysis.
56 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 17-19
(2000).
57 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
58 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
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pert decisionmaking.5 9 Thus, Rover will defend his aggressive con-
struction of the Vehicles in the Park statute like a tigress defending her
cubs and will dismiss criticisms as meddlesome. A judicial second
look, in light of the entire statutory context, is a useful and often nec-
essary corrective, particularly in criminal cases. What psychologists
call "cognitive loafing," an unwillingness to engage in self-critical
thinking, is a general problem in the modern regulatory state. Profes-
sor Seidenfeld argues, based on scientific evidence in this field, that
judicial monitoring of agency rules ought to ameliorate this problem.
60
To be sure, the monitoring advantages of judicial second-guessing
might be offset by countervailing judicial biases.61 As before, my
point is that an institutional cost-benefit analysis must consider this
kind of evidence. Judging Under Uncertainty would have benefited
from analysis of Professor Seidenfeld's thoughtful article.
Third, there would be systemic and maybe even constitutional costs
to a shift toward more agency lawmaking. In addition to being driven
by demands from institutional or client group self-interest, dynamic
agency interpretations of statutes are often driven by pressure from
congressional subcommittees, including appropriations subcommit-
tees.62  And increasingly, White House organs press dynamic interpre-
tations upon independent as well as executive agencies, often over the
objections of agency experts. 63 Policy pressure from the White House
is part of a larger shift of lawmaking power from Congress to the
President. For interstitial lawmaking, such pressures are cause for
some concern, but when they shift policy dramatically, they alter the
fundamental structure of lawmaking in our polity. Specifically, con-
gressional or even executive subgroups can now revise statutory policy
without going through the Article I, Section 7 process. This phenome-
non should be troubling to legal commentators.
64
59 See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 496-99, 504-08 (2002).
60 See id. at 508-26; see also Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects
of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (999).
61 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking To Reduce Cognitive
Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 629 (2002).
62 See Jeff Gill, Formal Models of Legislative/Administrative Interaction: A Survey of the Sub-
field, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REv 99, oo (995).
63 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2285-90 (2oo1);
John Horgan, Political Science, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Dec. 18, 2005, at ii (reviewing CHRIS
MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005)) (discussing the Bush Administration's
repeated attempts to overrule expert opinion in scientific and environmental agencies).
64 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Ad-
ministrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 452-56 (1989) (critiquing Chevron as a "siren's song,
seductive but treacherous"); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 123-28 (1994).
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B. The Yo-Yo Problem
There is a practical effect that an institutional cost-benefit analysis
must consider. It is much easier for an agency to change its interpreta-
tion of a statute than for a court to alter its own previous interpreta-
tion. Professor Vermeule celebrates this for reasons laid out by Justice
Scalia's excellent dissent in United States v. Mead.65 The Mead Court
ruled that Chevron deference usually does not apply to agency inter-
pretations when Congress has not formally delegated substantive
rulemaking responsibilities. 66 Professor Vermeule deems the decision
"disastrous on institutional grounds" (p. 215) because it requires lower
courts to make ad hoc judgments as to whether Chevron applies and,
more importantly, leaves federal judges free to disagree with agency
interpretations in many more cases (pp. 215-23). Justice Scalia also
argued that a broader Chevron rule would allow agencies to update
their interpretations - which less deferential regimes do not allow, as
when the courts have settled on a meaning that the agency cannot
change. 67 In most cases, no frills textualism would not allow judicial
precedents to prevent further agency updating.
I have long maintained that agencies, not courts, should be the
primary institutions that update statutes. 68 But a thorough institu-
tional analysis requires consideration of the costs as well as benefits of
Justice Scalia's and Professor Vermeule's broad understanding of def-
erence. One cost of an agency-driven dynamism would be a yo-yo ef-
fect, with some legal rules changing every time a new President is
elected. Most dynamic theorists agree that there needs to be a balance
of stability and evolution in statutory law and that the balance should
be weighted in favor of stability, with change coming gradually or in-
terstitially.69 This balance may reflect an outdated common law bias,
but an institutional cost-benefit analysis must find better tools for ana-
lyzing the consequences of upsetting this traditional balance.
C. The Hydraulic Problem
Assume that Professor Vermeule is right in believing that agencies
are the best policy implementers and that federal judges overturn a lot
of good agency rules. I am doubtful that no frills textualism would
solve this problem. It might even make it worse.
65 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 221 (majority opinion).
67 See id. at 243-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Interpretation of Economic Regulatory Legisla-
tion (Countervailing Duty Law), 2 1 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 663, 672-78, 694-95 (199o).
69 See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 9; Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 225 (999).
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Whatever the interpretive method, federal judges will usually find
some way to exercise authority over agency decisions. An example is
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,1o the "model opinion" for Vermeulean
statutory interpretation (pp. 227-28). Enacted to override a judicial
decision allowing foreign imports fraudulently competing with Ameri-
can goods, the Tariff Act of 19227' barred importations of "merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise.., bears a trade-
mark owned" by an American citizen or firm; 72 the Tariff Act of I93o 73
carried over this provision.7 4 Subsequently, "gray market" imports en-
tered this country under conditions that did not defraud the American
mark holder but fell within the terms of the statute. The Customs
Service created a "common-control" exception for goods manufactured
abroad by the American trademark holder or its affiliate (division,
subsidiary, or parent)7 5 and an "authorized-use" exception when the
imported goods were licensed by an American owner. 76 Foreign com-
panies seeking to charge higher prices for goods sold by their Ameri-
can subsidiaries challenged both agency exceptions. Delivering the
disposition for the Court, Justice Kennedy upheld the Service's com-
mon-control exception and invalidated its authorized-use exception.
K Mart is an odd model for Professor Vermeule to celebrate. Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion, allowing the Service to exempt products bear-
ing a domestic trademark and manufactured abroad by the owner or
its subsidiary, carved out of the law goods falling within its plain
meaning - "merchandise of foreign manufacture" bearing a trade-
mark "owned" by an American firm. In a linguistic stretch, Justice
Kennedy opined that "merchandise of foreign manufacture" might
mean merchandise manufactured by "a foreign company. '77 Justice
Kennedy's reading of the statutory term is not the meaning it ordinar-
ily conveys, however; the antonym of "foreign manufacture" is "domes-
tic manufacture," not "citizen manufacture," as Justice Scalia tartly ob-
served in dissent. 78 Indeed, the Customs Service had never used the
term in Justice Kennedy's way and had not argued this linguistic point
before the Court, presumably because such an idiosyncratic reading
could render the common-control exception unavailable to goods
manufactured by foreign subsidiaries (as opposed to divisions) of
70 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
71 Pub. L. No. 68-318, 42 Stat. 858 (1922).
72 Id. § 526(a), 42 Stat. at 975.
73 i9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202, 1301-681 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
74 See i U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2000).
75 9 C.F.R. § 133.23(d)(I)-(2) (2005) (formerly codified at i9 C.F.R. § 133.2i(c)(I)-(2) (1987)).
76 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(cX3) (1987), invalidated by K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,
291 (1988).
77 K Mart, 486 U.S. at 292.
78 Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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American companies.7 9  Finally, Justice Kennedy's construction, if
taken seriously, would exempt goods that every Justice believed were
covered - namely, those for which a foreign firm has licensed its
trademark to two American firms, one for manufacture in this country
and the other for manufacture abroad.80 This is, in fact, close to the
fraud scenario that had been the original impetus for the statutory bar.
Justice Kennedy's acceptance of the common-control exception is
an example of agency deference contrary to the statutory text, but his
invalidation of the authorized-use exception is an example of non-
deferential review. Justice Kennedy found the authorized-use excep-
tion inconsistent with statutory plain meaning.8 1 In dissent, Justice
Brennan raised an interesting point. In 1922 and 1930, when the rele-
vant tariff statutes were enacted, the "source theory" required mark
holders to sell, and not license, their marks to third parties; some cases
ruled that a mark holder who licensed a third party to use a mark had
abandoned ownership. Not until the 193os did licensing trademarks
(without abandoning ownership) become legally acceptable.8 2 In or
before 1930, lawyers could have read the statutory text to permit the
authorized-use exception, for they would not have assumed that a li-
censed trademark could have been "owned" by an American firm. Jus-
tice Brennan's argument makes a better textual case for the author-
ized-use exception than Justice Kennedy's makes for the common-use
exception. Moreover, this example illustrates the possibly wooden lim-
its imposed by no frills textualism. Given the state of trademark law,
Congress in 1922 could not have anticipated the authorized-use case,
and it makes policy sense to give the agency leeway to adapt the statu-
tory bar to new legal circumstances.
K Mart, the model opinion of a no frills, deferential textualism, is a
mess. As a result of Justice Kennedy's disposition, the Customs Ser-
vice can allow importation of foreign gray market goods if they are
79 A foreign subsidiary of an American firm is, literally, a foreign entity. Under Justice Ken-
nedy's understanding of "foreign manufacture," the common-control exception would not apply to
goods manufactured by the foreign subsidiary unless the Court declared that "foreign" subsidiar-
ies are actually "American" for purposes of the statute. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 2o, at i 19.
80 See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 319-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Pro-
fessor Vermeule writes that the dissent relied only on the argument that collateral statutes and
regulations used the term differently than did the Customs Service (p. 227). That is wrong. Jus-
tice Scalia's core argument focused on the statute itself and its regulations. Only after he made
the points I summarize in the text did he link them to other regulations. See id. at 321. Hence,
Professor Vermeule's suggestion that "most of the work in anti-deferential textualism is done by
recourse to collateral statutes and provisions" (p. 228) is inconsistent with the K Mart dissent,
which is the only reference he gives for this proposition.
81 Id. at 293-94 (majority opinion).
82 See id. at 312-15 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see id. at
323-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (providing an excellent response to
Justice Brennan's analysis).
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manufactured by a foreign division of the American mark holder, but
not by a foreign company licensed to use the mark, and perhaps not by
a foreign subsidiary of the mark holder. This resolution rests upon
neither a linguistically correct understanding of the statutory text nor
an intelligible or coherent policy.
The K Mart mess also suggests a general hydraulic problem with
Professor Vermeule's belief that no frills textualism plus strong agency
deference will remove judicial interference with important statutory
questions. If judges are as mistake-ridden as Professor Vermeule be-
lieves, will they shape up just because they follow his approach? I
doubt it. The hydraulic problem suggests that the bad practices Pro-
fessor Vermeule highlights - good agency rules trumped by mistake-
prone judges - will pop up under his approach as well. Rather than
saying that the agency is violating the statutory compromise or the
purpose suggested by its legislative history, agency-trumping federal
judges can assert, as Justice Scalia did in K Mart, that the agency's
rule is inconsistent with statutory plain meaning. Judges inclined
against invalidating an interpretation will assert, as Justice Kennedy
did for the common-use exception and Justice Brennan did for the au-
thorized-use exception, that there is linguistic ambiguity.
83
There is no logical correlation between a plain meaning methodol-
ogy and deference to agency rulemaking. Nor is there a connection in
practice. For example, even though Justice Scalia is the Court's most
avid supporter of agency deference and its most insistent textualist, he
is the Justice who was least deferential to agency interpretations be-
tween 1994 and 2005; the most deferential Justice was Justice Breyer,
who religiously follows the traditional approach.8 4 Moreover, politics
may have made a difference in deference rates. According to an
analysis by Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein, Justice Scalia
deferred only 48% of the time in Clinton Administration cases, but
about 68% of the time when the Bush Administration was defending
agency interpretations. 85 Justice Breyer's numbers show the reverse
pattern: about 95% (Clinton) versus about 81% (Bush).86 But note
that even the liberal Justice Breyer, who follows the traditional ap-
83 My analysis does not suggest that Congress cannot control or limit willful judges. But the
mechanism for control would have to be structural (such as stripping courts of jurisdiction) rather
than interpretive (such as telling judges to focus on plain meaning rather than legislative history).
84 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2oo6) (manuscript at 34 tbl.i,
on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (reporting that Justice Scalia deferred 59% of the
time in cases decided between 1995 and 2005, the lowest rate on the Court and that the most def-
erential Justices were Breyer, 89.5%; Ginsburg, 86%; Souter, 8o.8%; and Stevens, 73.3%, all of
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proach, has deferred much more often to the Bush Administration
than conservative Justice Scalia, a strict textualist and outspoken de-
fender of deference.
V. ARE FEDERAL JUDGES INCOMPETENT To HANDLE
COMPLICATED LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS?
The statutory case discussed at greatest length in Judging Under
Uncertainty is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,8 7 in which
the Supreme Court held that the importation of an Episcopalian minis-
ter from England did not violate section I of an 1885 immigration law
prohibiting contracts for transporting an alien into this country for
"labor or service of any kind.""" In a captivating chapter, Professor
Vermeule concludes that the Court got the result wrong even under
conventional criteria, that the error was induced by the Court's mis-
reading of legislative history, and that Holy Trinity is evidence of sys-
tematic problems with judges' ability to use legislative history skill-
fully enough to reach correct results (pp. 86-117).
The Court's examination of the legislative history contained a big
mistake. Specifically, the Court relied on an 1884 Senate committee
report stating that the drafters would have phrased the statutory bar
in section i as applicable only to "manual labor" or "manual service"
had there been time to amend the bill.8 9 In fact, as Professor Vermeule
demonstrates, the Senate carried the bill over to the 1885 session yet
still failed to clarify section i in this way; indeed, the Senate sponsor
admitted that section i remained too broadly drafted and ought to
have been amended (pp. 93-98). However, it is not clear that this was
a material error, because the Court's main argument rested upon the
statute's overall purpose. As Professor Carol Chomsky has shown, the
Court correctly found that the purpose of the statute was to stop the
wholesale importation of cheap labor driving down wages for Ameri-
can workers and that there was no surfeit of ministers and other
"brain toilers." 90 Convicting the Church for bringing a minister from
abroad would not serve this purpose and could justify a narrow con-
struction of "labor or service of any kind" in section I of the statute. 91
Professor Chomsky's research also casts doubt on Professor Ver-
meule's argument that section 5, which excepted "actors, artists, lec-
87 ,43 U.S. 457 (1892).
88 Id. at 458 (quoting Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § i, 23 Stat. 332, 332).
89 Id. at 464 (quoting i5 CONG. REC. 6059 (1884)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in
Statutory Interpretation, ioo COLUM. L. REV. 901, 931 (2000); see also id. at 922-40.
91 The primary definition of "labor" in I885 was manual work; "service" was work under an-
other's direction. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 509, 1518 (1998).
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turers, or singers" from the statute, 92 confirms the breadth of section i.
It is not apparent that the legislation's supporters considered section 5
an exhaustive list. For instance, Senator John Sherman, a key sup-
porter, characterized sections i and 5, read together, as limiting the
statute to "the importation of men who come here under special con-
tracts, mostly in large numbers, to work at largely reduced pay.
93
Moreover, the legislative history helps the interpreter understand a
structural argument that also lends support to the Court's interpreta-
tion of "labor or service" as excluding ministers. Section 4 of the stat-
ute made it a crime for the master of a ship to knowingly bring over
"any alien laborer, mechanic, or artisan" for "labor or service" in this
country.94 Section 4 is text-based evidence that Congress was only fo-
cusing on certain classes of workers - artisans and mechanics as well
as manual workers (but not ministers and other "brain toilers"). Pro-
fessor Vermeule believes that section 4's narrower ambit confirms the
breadth of section i (p. ioi), but he is probably mistaken. The legisla-
tive history suggests that section i and section 4 were in pari materia
- they were meant to cover the same classes of imported workers.
95
Because the category of workers covered by section 4 includes manual
laborers and some skilled workers, but clearly not ministers, there is
further textual evidence that the pastor fell outside section i, as con-
ventionally understood.96 (Section 4 also suggests a reason why the
sponsors were ultimately unwilling to limit section i to "manual" labor
or service: they believed "artisans" and "mechanics" were also being
imported in excessive numbers.)
Holy Trinity is the only evidence Professor Vermeule presents for
the abstract proposition that courts are incapable of analyzing legisla-
tive history accurately. The Court's mistaken reference was occa-
sioned by the government's failure to brief the legislative history issue
92 § 5, 23 Stat. at 333.
93 Chomsky, supra note 9o, at 931 (quoting 16 CONG. REC. 1635 (1885) (statement of Sen.
Sherman)). Professor Vermeule points to a colloquy between Senators Henry William Blair (the
floor manager) and John Tyler Morgan (an opponent) in which each legislator asserted that he
intended to introduce an amendment to enlarge the section 5 list of exceptions (pp. 97-98). That
neither introduced such an amendment suggests that this exchange was a classic example of
"cheap talk," which judges properly discount when reading legislative history. Daniel B. Rodri-
guez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives
on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1445-48 (2003).
Senator Sherman's remarks, quoted in the text, were a response to the Blair-Morgan exchange.
94 § 4, 23 Stat. at 333.
95 Senator Blair, the floor manager, said that section 4 was aimed at "the man who knowingly
brings an immigrant from foreign shores to our own, who comes here under and by virtue of a
contract such as is prohibited by [section i of] the bill." I6 CONG. REC. 1630 (1885) (statement of
Sen. Blair); accord id. at 1785 (statement of Sen. Blair); id. at 1629 (statement of Sen. McPherson);
id. at 1626 (statement of Sen. Blair).
96 See Eskridge, supra note gi, at 1517-19, 1533-41.
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(pp. 103-04). This was an understandable error of advocacy, for the
Court did not give committee reports such decisive weight before
I892.97 This is not an error the government or other repeat-player liti-
gants have often made in the century since Holy Trinity. Nonetheless,
Professor Vermeule argues that the structure of adjudication creates
systematic problems with judicial use of legislative history.9 Because
modern legislative histories are voluminous and heterogeneous (pp.
i 10-I4), the adversarial parties can cherry-pick sources that the opin-
ionated judge can use to distort the statute (pp. 114-15). It is worth
noting, however, that advocates will cherry-pick, and opinionated
judges will seize upon, almost any kind of interpretive source - in-
cluding dictionaries, linguistic canons of interpretation, and judicial
precedent. Legislative history might be distinctive in its greater vol-
ume, but Professor Vermeule presses this reasonable suggestion too far
when he claims that, given the constraints of the adjudicative process,
judges simply cannot handle legislative history competently.
Professor Vermeule's point would be more cogent if there were
more recent examples and systematic data of the sort that Professors
Brudney and Ditslear are generating for the proposition that consult-
ing legislative history curtails judicial discretion. 99 K Mart illustrates
how far judges have come in this regard. Although Justice Kennedy's
willingness to affirm the agency's common-control exception was
grounded upon an unsatisfactory textual analysis, Justice Brennan's
case for the exception was grounded upon an illuminating analysis of
the legislative history.10 0 Similar to the Holy Trinity statute, the K
Mart statute was enacted to solve a particular issue, namely, fraud
against an American company that purchased a foreign trademark
only to see the market flooded by goods manufactured by the foreign
seller, but the broad statutory phrasing led to anomalous applications
over time. 10 1 The Customs Service sought to limit the policy damage
through the common-control and authorized-use exceptions, which left
the statutory bar available for the core abuse but allowed nonfraudu-
lent imports to proceed. 102 One reason Justice Brennan's legislative
analysis was so sharp is that the legislative history was well briefed by
97 See Chomsky, supra note 90, at 944-46 (noting that Holy Trinity is seen as a modest innova-
tion in the Court's deployment of legislative sources to trump an apparent plain meaning).
98 Cf. Cross, supra note 3I, at 1054 (arguing that the structure of the "adjudication process ex-
acerbates the ill-informed nature of judicial review" of agency rules).
99 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
100 See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 302-09 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
101 See id. at 300-02.
102 See Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 37-43, K Mart, 486 U.S. 281 (No. 86-495) (surveying
the evolution of the Customs Service regulation).
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the Government (unlike in Holy Trinity).10 3 Because agencies are well
versed in legislative history and are involved in so many statutory
cases, the adjudicative process usually does a good job of handling this
complicated material - with one important side effect: it gives agency
interpretations an advantage, even when litigants on the other side are
well financed, as in K Mart. This side effect suggests why Justice
Breyer, a consumer of legislative history, is more deferential to agency
interpretations than is Justice Scalia, who usually will not read a word
of it. This poses a dilemma for Professor Vermeule, who dislikes legis-
lative history but wants judges to be more deferential to agencies.
Even in the cases in which the legislative history is complicated, it
is rarely intractable and, read judiciously, can be educational. In cases
like Holy Trinity, such history can helpfully show judges:
(a) how language (such as "labor or service") was used when the
statute was enacted;
(b) the relationship of various provisions or parts of the statute to
one another and to the overall design (for example, the relationship
among sections i, 4, and 5 of the alien contract law);
(c) the legislative purpose (to prevent the flooding of labor markets);
(d) compromises and deals made to secure needed votes for enact-
ment (the argument that section 5 was carefully bargained for and
therefore an exhaustive list);
(e) the values and assumptions held by the legislators; and
(f) decisions that were not made or even contemplated (it never oc-
curred to any member of Congress in 1884-1885 that the statute would
be applied to ministers).
Today's judge would not even need comprehensive briefing to re-
search and learn from the legislative history, especially the committee
report, of the Vehicles in the Park statute. 10 4 In the Case of the Tricy-
cle, the report provides important context for the judge - a stranger
to the statute - to understand what Congress meant by terms like
"vehicle," what problem it was trying to solve by banning vehicles
from federal parks, and how the vehicles law relates to the previously
enacted bicycle law. Even if initially persuaded that the law's defini-
tion of vehicle is broad enough to include a tricycle, any reasonable
103 See id. at 13-31 (surveying the legislative history of section 526 of the Tariff Act).
104 Although the Solicitor General believed statutory interpretation issues had been waived in
the recent Solomon Amendment litigation, and therefore did not brief the 2004 amendment to the
statute, see Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 20 n.4, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institu-
tional Rights, Inc., 74 U.S.L.W. 4159 (Mar. 6, 2006) (No. 04-1152), 2005 WL 2841654, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts had no difficulty locating relevant legislative history, which decisively supported Sec-
retary Rumsfeld. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 74 U.S.L.W at 4161-62.
Every participating Justice (including Scalia) joined the Chief Justice's legislative history analysis.
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judge would reconsider in light of this evidence. Committee reports
are easy to find, have a high educational value, and are usually given
sufficient context by the adversarial parties (especially if the govern-
ment is involved in the case). There are many examples of skilled ju-
dicial analysis of committee reports and other legislative history from
recent Terms of the Court,105 illustrating a high level of judicial com-
petence in analyzing legislative materials today. 106
There is a larger point to be made. Much scholarship in the last
generation has taken the Court to task for particular statutory opinions
or lines of statutory cases. The criticisms have generally not been that
the Justices are incapable of a sophisticated understanding of legisla-
tive history and related statutes (key sources purged under a no frills
textualism), but rather that the Justices and the relevant agencies
brought too little substantive or historical understanding to the eco-
nomic or social problems Congress was regulating. 07 This observa-
tion lends support to Professor Vermeule's skepticism with respect to
federal judges' skill as policy analysts. But are they any better as tex-
tual analysts? Not necessarily. According to scholars in many fields,
the Court's performance has been particularly dismal, even under rule-
of-law criteria, when the Justices (including Justice Scalia) have de-
ferred to agencies or asserted textual plain meanings. 10 8 In his book
on judicial interpretation, Justice Scalia vigorously argues that Holy
Trinity should have been decided by reference to statutory plain mean-
ing and structure, yet he ignores contemporary definitions of "labor"
105 See, e.g., Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 74 U.S.L.W. 4159; Koons Buick
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S. Ct. 460, 467-69 (2004); id. at 470 (Stevens, J., concurring); Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004); Boeing Co. v. United States, 537
U.S. 437 (2003). Also see the excellent legislative history debates between the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2ooo); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
106 See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 206-2 12. But see William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statu-
tory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (200o) (criticizing judicial comparisons of provisions
from different statutes because of the shifting membership and political terrain in Congress).
107 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, iio HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754-57 0997).
108 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail
of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv 1317 (2003) (providing a
scathing analysis of Justice Scalia's textualist ERISA jurisprudence as ignorant of the common
law context for ERISA and the practical problems facing pension programs); Alan Schwartz, The
New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Jurisprudence,
45 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 149 (2000) (providing a skeptical analysis of textualism in bankruptcy
cases); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287
0985) (arguing that some judges are incapable of handling legislative history competently, but
that they are no more competent to engage in textual or other forms of legal analysis because they
are either politically motivated or cognitively challenged).
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and "service" and does not consider the relevance of section 4. 109
While the Holy Trinity Court did not read the entire legislative history,
it also bears noting that Holy Trinity's primary judicial critic, and the
champion of the new textualism, failed to read the statute.
VI. WHAT WOULD A VERMEULEAN REGIME LOOK LIKE?
Judging Under Uncertainty presents no entirely cogent reason to
adopt no frills textualism as the federal courts' mode of interpreting
statutes. But more convincing reasons to support such a theory may
exist. Consider the interesting consequences that may result from no
frills textualism as it might play out over time.
Assume that the Vermeulean Court interprets the Vehicles in the
Park law to include tricycles. This absurdity would probably not lead
to a stable result. Under criticism, the Parks Commission might
change its mind, which the Vermeulean Court would allow unless the
prior opinion had interpreted the statute to include tricycles as a mat-
ter of law. If the Commission does nothing, congressional subcommit-
tees or executive officials might bring pressure to bear. This is a po-
tential cost of no frills textualism, for the political system would be
expending energy on an issue that could have been settled by the
courts. But it is also a potential benefit, because it could render the
political branches more firmly accountable for the evolution of statu-
tory policy. No longer could the Commission or Congress avoid re-
sponsibility for park safety by passing the buck to the courts.
11 0
If the Court rules that the statute necessarily includes tricycles,
Congress might override the result by amending the statute, perhaps
by adding a proviso at the end of section 3: "Provided that, 'vehicle'
shall not include tricycles or bicycles." No frills textualism would
probably trigger more congressional overrides of judicial interpreta-
tions of federal statutes - maybe a lot more. 1 ' This could be another
cost of no frills textualism, as frequent legislative overrides might con-
sume too much of the limited legislative agenda. But it could also be a
benefit, because it is often more appropriate for the executive and leg-
islative branches to correct broad textual commands than for the
courts. A Vermeulean revolution might even motivate Congress to
create a process by which its committees would systematically review
109 SCALIA, supra note 3, at 18-23.
110 In a world in which courts correct unreasonable consequences of applying statutory plain
meanings, legislators might have more ways to avoid accountability for bad policies: "The reason
parks are not safer is that judicial activists have rewritten the statute to exempt unsafe vehicles!"
S11 See Eskridge, supra note 26, at 35o-5I (finding that Congress overrode a disproportionate
number of Supreme Court decisions relying on textual plain meaning from 1978 to 1984).
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judicial constructions; less controversial overrides (like my tricycle ex-
ample) might be handled on a procedural fast track. 112
Another potential benefit is closer executive or congressional moni-
toring of implementing agencies, such as the Parks Commission in my
hypothetical. The tricycle episode might spell the end of Karl Rover's
tenure as Parks Commissioner. Imagine that the new commissioner,
Mary Sheney, only goes after kids who pose more serious park safety
risks. Thus, she arrests a boy rollerskating and a girl skateboarding in
the park. Defense attorneys protest that roller skates and skateboards
are not within the statute's ambit. Under the traditional approach, the
defense would argue that it is idiosyncratic to use "vehicle" to include
roller skates and skateboards, the legislative history of the statute and
the new proviso suggest a congressional intent to focus on motor vehi-
cles, roller skates and skateboards pose less of a threat to the statutory
safety purpose, and there is enough ambiguity in the law or absurdity
in the application to trigger the rule of lenity. The defendants would
probably win under the traditional approach but ought to lose under
no frills textualism. The prosecutor could demonstrate that skate-
boards and roller skates are "mechanism[s] for conveying a person
from one place to another," as "vehicle" is defined in section 3. Be-
cause the proviso's exceptions do not include skateboarding or roller-
skating, this case falls within Professor Vermeule's analysis of Holy
Trinity. If there is any doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the
agency, for the rule of lenity has been reversed.
The Case of the Forbidden Roller Skates is another example in
which the traditional approach is predictable and reaches a sensible
result, in contrast to the silly result seemingly dictated by no frills tex-
tualism. Herein lies another dimension of no frills textualism: on a
Vermeulean Court, the Justices' focus would be narrower than under
the traditional approach. To discern whether "vehicle" includes roller
skates and skateboards, the Justices would ignore the legislative his-
tory, the statutory purpose, and other contextual factors. Some Jus-
tices would uphold the convictions, for the reasons described in the
previous paragraph. Alarmed at the unreasonableness of that result,
others would wonder whether there might be a no frills way to acquit
the rollerskating boy. They would examine dictionaries, linguistic his-
tories, newspapers, and magazines to see if "vehicle" has ever been
used to describe roller skates and skateboards. Finding insufficient
evidence, they could vote to overturn.,1 3  The upholding Justices
112 See also Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A
Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 8o GEO. L.J. 653 (1992) (describing a process by which
selected federal appellate opinions were forwarded to congressional committees for review).
113 The fact that the statute defines "vehicle" is not necessarily the end of the inquiry under a
textualist approach. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 5 15 U.S.
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would then conduct their own searches. Some might change their
minds; others might support the skateboard conviction but overturn
the rollerskating conviction; others might still uphold both. The Ver-
meulean Court would issue a decision, with dueling opinions resem-
bling the text-based debate between Justices Breyer and Ginsburg over
the meaning of "carry a firearm" in Muscarello v. United States.
1 14
Muscarello gives us some notion of what a no frills legisprudence
might look like. It would be very different from the traditional legis-
prudence, but not necessarily in the ways that Professor Vermeule
thinks. Simplicity would not replace complexity, research would not
necessarily become easier, agency deference would not replace agency
defiance, and bad decisions would not give way to good ones. The
biggest difference would be that statutory interpretation would look
more technical (and boring) and less normative than it looks now. "In"
would be dictionaries, expert linguists, and online surveys of popular
publications. 1 5 "Out" would be normative canons like the rule of len-
ity, discussions of fairness and absurdity, and statutory purpose.
A legisprudence of dictionaries and such would be an unfortunate
charade, more because the Justices would be closeting the normative
influences on their judgments than because they would repeatedly
reach squalid results or squeeze policy into ridiculous boxes. From the
Court's perspective and perhaps, as Professor Vermeule would insist,
the country's as well, a legisprudence of dictionaries and close textual
analysis could have advantages over current practice: it might engage
federal judges in enterprises they are most capable of pursuing, the
opinions might appear more neutral and lawyerly, the public might
perceive the federal courts to be less political, and judges might even
come to see themselves as less political. My initial impression, how-
ever, is that federal judges are no better analysts of statutory texts than
of legislative history, the opinions would remain highly political, the
public that follows such matters would not be fooled, and judges who
see textualism as unpolitical would be deluding themselves.116
687, 717-18 (I995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting "take" by reference to both the statutory
definition and common law and ordinary usage).
114 524 U.S. 125 (1998). The issue in Muscarello was whether a sentence enhancement for a
defendant who "carries a firearm" in connection with another crime should cover situations in
which the defendants had engaged in illegal drug transactions with guns in the trunk or glove
compartment of their cars. The majority held that "carry a firearm" includes carting it around in
one's car, see id. at 126-27; the dissenting opinion limited the term to "packing heat" on one's per-
son, id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115 These are on full display in Muscarello. In her dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Scalia,
Justice Ginsburg disputed the majority's evidence - drawn from a wide range of dictionaries, a
survey of newspapers and magazines, and the Bible - and relied on her own array of sources,
including the television show M*A*S*H. See id. at 142-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116 Justice Scalia, for example, says that textualism requires judges to consider "whether you
could use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny."
[VOL. 119:20412072
HeinOnline -- 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2072 2005-2006
NO FRILLS TEXTUALISM
So even this attractive feature of no frills textualism fails to move
me (and the pretension of deference to agencies alarms me), but I have
sufficient questions to suggest an experiment. The Supreme Court
should decidedly not throw over the traditional approach in favor of
no frills textualism, but a state supreme court might do so, preferably
in a state where judges routinely refer to legislative history. The
state's judges could fill in the details of Professor Vermeule's approach
and adapt it to address problems they encounter. If scholars, judges,
and lawyers find success in this experiment, other states might follow.
Only after extensive and successful road testing in the state courts
should the Supreme Court move toward this significant change in fed-
eral practice.
CONCLUSION: Quo VADIS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION?
Judging Under Uncertainty illustrates how statutory interpretation
theory risks becoming ungrounded. Earlier theorists, such as Professor
Hart, and many recent ones, such as Professors Brudney, Elizabeth
Garrett, Victoria Nourse, Stephen Ross, and Jane Schacter, have pro-
pounded ideas about statutory interpretation that are informed by ex-
tensive experience in the legislative or administrative process (or both).
Justice Scalia's views about statutory interpretation in Mead are pow-
erful because they reflect his deep experience as a former executive de-
partment official and a leading scholar of administrative law. The ca-
reer model represented by these thinkers is in decline, as most law
professors now enter teaching with little or no experience in the legis-
lative or administrative process. Younger scholars have introduced in-
teresting new ideas, but ideas without a deep grounding in the legisla-
tive and administrative processes may not be the best way to develop
this field.
Judging Under Uncertainty reflects this risk. Although fresh and
interesting, its deployment of decision theory has little payoff for our
deeper understanding of statutory interpretation. In my view, a more
productive contribution would be to combine institutional analysis
with a richer empirical base. This is the project that Professors Brud-
ney and Ditslear are carrying out in labor law and that Professors
Daniel Schneider, Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt, and Peter Wiedenbeck
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He mistakenly believes
that this is a neutral inquiry. But how one's interpretation will be received is contingent on what
crowd the party attracts. To say that race-based affirmative action is discrimination or that en-
dangered species regulations are often compensable takings of property would raise eyebrows at a
Harvard University faculty party, but not at a Federalist Society convention. As to many of the
normative terms that judges are called upon to interpret, cocktail party textualism is like looking
out over a crowd and finding your friends already there, preselected.
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are initiating in tax law.11 7 Although I doubt that empirical surveys
will settle the normative issues raised by the new textualism and dy-
namic theories of statutory interpretation, such work gives us a richer
grounding for theoretical discussion.
Another risk is overgeneralization. Professor Vermeule's no frills
textualism presents itself as a transsubstantive theory: whatever the
subject area, judges should defer to agency interpretations unless those
interpretations are inconsistent with the surface meaning of the statu-
tory text. In contrast, Professor Jon Siegel argues that theories of
statutory interpretation should be substance specific.", s A scholar pur-
suing a substance-specific approach should study the history of statu-
tory interpretation in a particular subject area and extract from that
study and from normative authorities the kinds of rules, norms, and
practices that interpreters should apply in that field. Thus, proper
construction of the statutes relating to corporate governance, bank-
ruptcy, and secured transactions should be informed by scholarship
laying out the transactional realities of those fields and the efficiency
criteria that ought to drive such regulations.1 19 The Delaware Su-
preme Court has been a successful interpreter of corporations law not
because the judges faithfully follow statutory plain meanings, but be-
cause they understand the business and legal dynamics that undergird
the statutory scheme.
1 20
As the Case of the Tricycle reflects, no frills textualism is not an
appropriate approach for criminal statutes. 1 2 ' To cart the tricycle girl
or the rollerskating boy off to jail because the statutory definition of
"vehicle" is sufficiently broad would be unfair and would bring the
moral authority of criminal law to bear on conduct Congress did not
mean to criminalize. The worst fields for a no frills textualism would
117 See Lee Epstein et al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for
a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 305 (2003); Schneider, supra
note 2.
118 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L.
REV 1023 (998).
119 See, e.g., George G. "T-iantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Bounda-
ries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, I17 HARV. L.
REV. 1 102 (2004) (explaining features of corporate, bankruptcy, and secured transactions law as a
way to allow optimal monitoring of corporate managers).
120 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 39-41
('993).
121 But see Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, i io HARV. L. REV.
469 (1996). Professor Kahan's article anticipates Professor Vermeule's argument that judges
should defer to Department of Justice interpretations of criminal laws. In a recent conversation,
however, Professor Kahan called the article a "youthful indiscretion." Cf Lawrence M. Solan,
Should Criminal Statutes Be Interpreted Dynamically?, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov.
2002, art. 8, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art8 (supporting the rule of lenity).
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be those, like criminal, antitrust, and civil rights law, that are domi-
nated by values of interest to the general population.
122
I should expect an agency-deferring textualist methodology to have
a better chance of success in fields that (i) are technical and generate
detailed statutory texts on which private parties rely, (2) are adminis-
tered by competent agencies with good reputations, and (3) are of little
normative interest to generalist judges. 123 For example, I originally
thought that textualism would be a more workable method for courts
to interpret the Internal Revenue Code: the main compromises are re-
flected in the text of the statute, and further details and updates are
provided by regulations crafted by the Internal Revenue Service,
which is fairly independent and well respected. 124 Unfortunately, my
reading of the tax literature leads me to hesitate. Most tax experts be-
lieve plain meaning analysis must be supplemented with legislative
history and purpose, as well as other contextual considerations.
125
Consider a final possibility. Congress often utilizes omnibus legisla-
tion, which addresses numerous (typically unrelated) issues in one huge
logroll. 126 Professor Garrett argues that judges interpreting omnibus
legislation should hew closely to the statutory language, with as little
fancy canonwork as possible, because of the ad hoc or unknowably
complex features of these megadeals. 2 ' No frills textualism, then,
might be cogently applied to omnibus legislation, but legal scholars
need to investigate this phenomenon more deeply. 28
122 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001). 'Teaties and international conventions are also poor candidates for a textualist methodol-
ogy. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998).
123 Bankruptcy law might be an example. Compare Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the
Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535
(1993) (yes), with Carlos J. Cuevas, Public Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J.
645 (1996) (no), C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of
Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265 (1992) (no), and Schwartz, supra note lo8 (no!).
124 See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71
TUL. L. REV. 1501 (997). But see Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal
Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1997) (critically discussing the Supreme Court's increasing
reliance on plain meaning in tax cases).
125 See, e.g., Deborah Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX
REV. 492 (995); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpre-
tations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986).
126 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 70-81 (2d ed. 2000).
127 See Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the Les-
sons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. i, at 6-15, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/artI.
128 Cf. Seth Grossman, Tricameral Legislating: Statutory Interpretation in an Era of Conference
Committee Ascendancy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that con-
ference committees distort the legislative process and urging very narrow construction of the re-
sulting omnibus legislation).
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